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Sovereign Debt




History suggests the following stylized facts about default
on sovereign debt:
(1) Defaults are associated with identifiably bad states of
the world.
(2)Defaultsare usually partial, rather than complete.
(3) Sovereign states usually are able to borrow again soon
after a default.
Motivated by these facts, this paper analyses a reputational
equilibrium in a model that interprets sovereign debts as
contingent claims that both finance investments and facilitate
risk shifting.
Loans are a useful device to facilitate risk shifting because
they permit the prepayment of indemnities. Nevertheless, because
the power to abrogate commitments without having to answer to a
higher enforcement authority is an essential aspect of
sovereignty, a decision by a sovereign to validate lender
expectations about debt servicing depends on the sovereign's
concern for its trustworthy reputation. A trustworthy reputation
is valuable because it provides continued access to loans. A key
aspect of the analysis is that lenders differentiate excusable
default, which is associated with implicitly understood
contingencies, from unjustifiable repudiation.
In the reputational equilibrium, the short—run benefits from
repudiation are smaller than the long—run costs from loss of a
trustworthy reputation. Thus, although sovereigns sometimes
excusably default, they never repudiate their debts. The
reputational equilibrium can involve efficient risk shifting and
efficient investment or it can involve a binding lending ceiling
that limits risk shifting and can also restrict investment. The
factors that tend to produce a binding lending ceiling include a
high time discount rate for the sovereign, low—risk aversion for
the sovereign, and a low net return from the sovereign's
investments.
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Providence, RI 02912 College Station, TX 77843History suggests the following stylized facts about defaults
on Sovereign debt:
(1) Defaults are associated with identifiably bad states of
the world.
2)Defaultsare usually partial rather than complete.
(3) Sovereign states often are able to borrow again soon
after default.
Motivated by these facts, this paper develops an analysis of
sovereign debt that interprets outcomes involving Sovereign
default as reflecting implicit understandings that a borrower may
justifiably adjust its debt servicing obligations if the realized
state of the world turns out to be unusually bad for the
borrower. The idea that sovereign debts in effect are contingent
claims implies that loans typically involve the shifting to the
lender of risks associated with the fortunes of the borrower, in
addition to the financing of investments by the borrower.
Moreover, this interpretation implies that, in forming
expectations about future sovereign behavior, lenders would
sharply differentiate defaults that are excusable, because they
are associated with implicitly understood contingencies, from
defaults that are inexcusable, because they involve unjustifiable
repudiation of servicing expectations. The extent of the risk
shifting embodied in a loan depends on the extent of default that
is excusable in the event of a bad realization.
The apparent rationale for the use of loans as a device to
facilitate risk shifting is the desirability of the prepayment of
indemnities. By borrowing an amount equal to the maximum
indemnity for which it would contract, a large agent like a
sovereign who wants to insure itself against the effects of bad
states of the world can draw on the resources of many smal.l and
anonymous insurers, with whom it would be costly to write and to
enforce contracts requiring the payment of an indemnity to the
sovereign after the realization of a bad state of the world. The
prepayment of indemnities as loans with contingent servicing—2—
commitments also allows the sovereign to execute the contract
without waiting for its lenders to verify the state of the world.
A critical aspect of all debts, whatever their risk—shifting
component, is the means for validating lenders' servicing
expectations——that is, for preventing unjustifiable repudiation.
In this regard, private and sovereign debts are fundamentally
different. Private debts are subject to laws regarding bankruptcy
and enforcement of collateral. Sovereign debts, in contrast, are
above the law. Indeed, the power to abrogate commitments without
having to answer to a higher enforcement authority is an essential
aspect of sovereignty.(On this interpretation, historical cases
in which one sovereign seized the assets of another apparent
sovereign who is failing to service its loans involve infringement
of sovereignty.)
In the existing literature on sovereign debts, Lucas and
Stokey (1983) develop a formal model of contingent debt as a
device to shift risk, but they abstract from the problem of
enforcing servicing commitments. Other recent literature,
although offering some suggestion that the possibility of default
implies risk shifting, does not analyze the relation between
servicing and the realized state of the world and does not
distinguish excusable default from unjustifiable repudiation.
See, for example, Eaton and Gersovitz (April 1981; June 1981)
Sachs (1982),Sachsand Cohen (1982), Kletzer (1984), and Manuelli
(1984)
The. fact that the servicing of sovereign debts, unlike
private debts, is not subject to external enforcement, suggests
that the decision by a sovereign not to repudiate its debts
depends on the sovereign's concern for its trustworthy reputation
for validating lenders' servicing expectations. The present paper
derives the properties of a reputational equilibrium in a model in
which sovereign debts serve to share risks to the mutual advantage
of borrowers and lenders, as well as to finance investments. A
key assumption of the model is that a sovereign's trustworthy
reputation is valuable because it generates expectations about—3—
future debt servicing that cause lenders to allow the sovereign
continued access to loans.
In the reputational equilibrium, which emerges as an
endogenous outcome of the repeated interaction between lenders and
the sovereign, lenders' expectations about contingent debt
servicing are such that the rational sovereign always chooses to
validate these expectations. In other words, even if the
sovereign sometimes excusably defaults, it never repudiates its
debts. In general, however, this reputational equilibrium can
require a lending ceiling that prevents the sovereign from
borrowing as much as it would if it could make a servicing
commitment that was subject to external enforcement.
I. Analytical Framework
To focus the analysis on essentials, assume that the
sovereign's lenders are risk neutral, that all sovereign debts are
implicitly contingent claims that mature in one period, and that
the sovereign can use the proceeds from its borrowings either to
invest in a concave risk—free productive technology that is
available only to itself and matures in one period or to purchase
risk—free assets that are generally available. The simplifying
assumption that the technology is risk—free separates the
sovereign's exposure to risk from its decision to invest and
enables the analysis to define efficient investment independently
of the availability of risk shifting. The assumptions about
technology also enable the analysis to abstract from the problems
of insolvency and moral hazard in investment. In general,
insolvency is not an important consideration because it implies a
less binding constraint on borrowing than does the temptation to
repudiate. The neglect of moral hazard, although a useful
analytical simplification, is more problematical because the
temptation for the sovereign to consume rather than to invest the
proceeds of its borrowing is both real and potentially related to
the temptation to repudiate.—4.-
In this setup, the sovereign borrows to invest, but services
debt in such a way as to shift risk to its lenders. Given the
lenders' expectations about contingent servicing of existing debt
formulated in period t—l, the sovereign's proximate choice
variables in period t are current debt service, the amount
of new debt to issue, bt, and an implicit plan tor contingent
servicing of this new debt. This planned servicing function is
Rt(zt+i), where z1 represents a distinguishable and
verifiable realization of a stochastic component of income in
period t+l. The choice of which in general is a point on
an actual servicing function St(zt), amounts to a decision
either to validate or to repudiate lenders' expectations.
The sovereign's objective is to maximize the expectation of





with u' > 0, u" < 0, and u'(O) =
whereEc,t is an operator that denotes an expectation taken over
possible realizations of c conditional on information available
in period t, c is an index of consumption in period t, and
is the sovereign's constant discount rate. Consumption in
period t equals the return from investing the proceeds of last
period's borrowing, F(bti), plus the current stochastic
component of income, Zt, minus current debt service, st——that
is,
(2) ct =F(bti)+ z —ssubject to 0.
The components of consumption are key elements of the
problem. The form of F( .)reflectsthe sovereign's choice to
invest in its productive technology until the marginal product
equals the depreciation rate of unity plus the risk—free interest—5--
rate. Accordingly, F( •)satisfiesF' > l+p and F" K 0 for
bti K B and F' =l+pand F" =0for bt_iB, where B is
a nonnegative parameter. The stochastic variable zt. has
discrete realizations ranging from a good state, Z, to a worst
state, with stationary probability distribution p(z) and
fixed mean .Tomake the interpretation of excusable default
interesting, assume that the probability of the good state,
p(Z),is large relative to the probabilities of the inferior
states like p( ) .Thenonnegativity constraint on reflects
the assumption that it is not feasible to write and to enforce
contracts that require insurers to indemnify the sovereign after
the realization of a bad state of the world.
One possible interpretation of this setup is that ct
represents national consumption and that F(bi) + z is real
national income. Another possibility, which may be more
realistic, is to regard the sovereign as a proprietor and to
interpret ct as the proprietor's own consumption and
F(bt_i) + z as the proprietor's income from taxes and other
sources net of expenditures necessary for its survival. Depending
on the choice between these interpretations, z can reflect
either the randomness of factors that affect real national income
or the randomness of factors, like external threats or internal
discontent, that affect the net revenues of a proprietary
sovereign. In any event, the concavity of u(ct) motivates the
sovereign to issue debt with planned servicing that is contingent
on z.
Equation (2) does not consider explicitly the possibility of
financing current consumption out of savings or out of current
borrowing. The important point is that, given that feasible
limits on savings and accumulated debt are finite, these devices,
even if available to the sovereign, could not facilitate complete
smoothing of consumption. As an analytical device, the randomness
of Zt can represent the net variability of resources available
for current consumption and debt service after allowing for net
current saving.—6—
The supply price of loans is a critical constraint on the
sovereign's choices. Given competition among the sovereign's
lenders, who are risk neutral, market clearing implies that the
expected value of debt servicing in period t+l conditional on
information available in period t equals the alternativerisk—




and Est[St÷1(z+i)J is the lenders' expectation, taken over
possible realizations of St+i(.), of the function that will
govern the sovereign's actual servicing decision in period t+l.
Equation (3) measures the expected value of debt servicing as the
sum over all possible states of z of the products of the
probability of each state occurring and the expectation of the
schedule of the amounts of servicing that the sovereign will
choose in each state.
The final component needed to complete the analytical
framework is the determination of Est[S÷i(zt+1)] .The analysis
assumes that the lenders' expectation of the amount of debt
servicing that the sovereign will provide next period in each
possible realized state of the world is based on common
knowledge. This assumption implies that lenders know the function
u(.). The key element in the analysis is the lenders' perception
of the strategy that the sovereign employs in attempting to
maximize its expected utility. The different solutions for the
properties of sovereign debt derived in the following sections
reflect possible differences in these strategies.
II.Efficient Risk Shifting and Excusable Default
To focus the analysis and provide a useful benchmark case,
suppose that the sovereign could irrevocably commit itself in
period t to a state—contingent debt—servicing function for—7—
period t+l, given by Rt(zi). This irrevocable commitment,
with servicing contingent on the realization ofz+i would
allow the possibility of excusable default, but would preclude
repudiation. Accordingly, this irrevocable commitment would
determine the lenders' expectation of the actual debt servicing
schedule——that is,
(4)Est[St÷i(ztifl =R(z+1).
Equation (4) implies that by choosing and irrevocably
committing itself to a servicing function, the sovereign directly
controls its lenders' expectations. At the same time, given an
irrevocable commitment, the sovereign has no effective choice
regarding the amount of current income to devote to servicing debt
issued last period. Its current choices involve only the amount
of new debt to issue and the contingent servicing commitment to
attach to this debt. The choices, given byb and






Equations (5) and (6) indicate that a sovereign who is
irrevocably committed not to repudiate would be able both to
invest efficiently, thereby maximizing expected consumption, and
to achieve efficient risk shifting, which in this case involves
shifting to its risk—neutral lenders all risk associated with the
stochastic component of income. Given the stationary structure of
the model, the implied amount of borrowing and the implied
contingent servicing function are time invariant. Equation (5)
gives an amount of borrowing that is sufficient both for the
sovereign to invest in its productive technology until the
marginal product equals one plus the risk—free interest rate and—8—
for its lenders to prepay the indemnity associated with the worst
state of the world, which is the discounted value of the
difference between z and .
Equation(6) gives a servicing function R(zt+i) that calls
for adding the difference, which can be positive or negative,
between the realization of z1 and the mean value z to
repayment of loans at interest rate p.The interpretation of
this servicing function is that the sovereign provides full
servicing, equal to Z —z+ (l+p)b, in the good state, but
provides less than full servicing in inferior states, with the
amount of default equal to the difference between Zand
In the case of 1equal to theworst state implies total
default. Finally, the complete risk shifting given by equation
(6) implies that consumption is independent of the realized state
of the world and equals the expected value of income, which is the
sum of the net revenue from the sovereign's investments and the
mean value of z——that is,
(7)c =F(b)—(l+p)b+ z.
III. Sovereignty and Repudiation
In reality, sovereigns do not, and by their nature probably
cannot, irrevocably commit themselves to a specific state—
contingent servicing schedule, or to any other policy. Indeed,
the power to abrogate commitments without having to answer to a
higher authority is an essential property of sovereignty.
Consequently, the analytical strategy of treating the lenders'
expectations of debt servicing as a choice variable for the
sovereign, which led to equations (5) and (6), does not seem to
provide an empirically relevant analysis of sovereign debt.
To consider another useful benchmark case, suppose that, in
addition to being incapable of controlling expectations through
irrevocable commitments, the sovereign naively ignores any effect
that its current actions have on expectations of its future—9—
actions. Instead, the sovereign simply chooses actual current
servicing, s, to maximize the expected utility of consumption,
EtUt, taking the lenders' expectation, formulated in period t,
of the servicing function for future periods,Est[St+i(zt+i)I
i1, as given. Because the partial effect of reducings is
to increase ct and
Ec the solution to this problem would
be an actual time—invarint servicing function S(zt) such that
St equals zero for all realizations of Zt.In other words, the
solution would be for the sovereign to repudiate any positive
servicing commitments.
Assuming that lenders correctly perceive that the sovereign
will face the same problem and obtain the same solution in the
next period, lenders would anticipate repudiation of any positive
servicing commitment for all realizations of Accordingly,
Est[St+i(zt+1H would equal zero and the constraint on the
expected value of debt servicing given by equation (3) would imply
that bt also equals zero. This analysis shows that a sovereign
who behaved naively in the sense of treating the servicing
expectations of its lenders as given would be unable to issue any
debt and unable to shift any risk. Such behavior would be
"suboptimal" in the sense that there are functions that imply
actual debt servicing greater than zero that would yield higher
expected utility, if the sovereign could convince its lenders to
expect such a function. The servicing function R(zt+i), given
by equation (6), is the best of such functions.
IV.Reputational Equilibrium
The analysis in the preceding sections assumed that the
sovereign treats lenders' expectations of debt servicing either as
a control variable or as a given. Both theoretical considerations
and actual experience suggest that these assumptions fail to
capture essential elements of the market for sovereign debt. To
develop a more interesting model, suppose that, although the
sovereign cannot directly control lenders' expectations about
future debt servicing by irrevocably committing itself to a— 10—
servicingschedule, it can influence these expectations through
its choice of the amount of current income to devote to debt
servicing. The linkage between current servicing and expectations
about future servicing is the sovereign's reputation for trust-
worthiness. Given this linkage, a rational sovereign would
consider how its current servicing decision affects its reputation
and how its reputation affects its ability to borrow now and in
the future. Only a sovereign that ignored its reputation would
behave as in Section iii, but such behavior would be naive.
The present analysis presumes that the sovereign is rational
and that the process by which it appoints and removes individual
policymakers is consistent with this presumption. Accordingly,
reputation resides with the sovereign and not with individual
policymakers.
To model the determination of the sovereign's reputation,
assume that lenders expect that the sovereign will always service
its debts in accord with the lenders' presumption that the
sovereign is rational as long as the sovereign has never violated
this presumption in the past.If, however, the sovereign were
ever to repudiate its debts, lenders would expect such behavior in
the future and the sovereign would lose its trustworthy
reputation.
In addition, lenders' expectations of debt servicing are
rational in the sense that lenders are able to replicate the
sovereign's solution of its choice problem. Specifically, if the
sovereign has a trustworthy reputation, lenders expect the actual
contingent servicing function to be the plan, given byR(zt+1),
that a rational sovereign, who knows how lenders would react to
repudiation, would formulate and actually carry out. Given the
stationary structure of the model, this function is time
invariant. If, however, a sovereign does not have a trustworthy
reputation, lenders expect it to choose zero servicing in order to
maximize current consumption. These assumptions about the
sovereign's reputation and lenders' expectations imply that— 11—
(8)for t =0,Est[St÷i(zt+i)I =R*(zti)and
for t > 0, either Es[St÷i(zt÷i)] =R*(z)
if S= R*(z .)forall j=0,...,t—l
t—j t—J
or Est[St+1(zt+i)} =0otherwise,
where the initial loan occurs in period zero (making s1 the
first observation on actual debt service)
The assumption that lenders have rational expectations
implies that announcements by the sovereign would not communicate
any information to the lenders. Accordingly, treating the
sovereign's plan for contingent debt servicing as an implicit
understanding with its lenders is innocuous. The only servicing
schedule that the sovereign would credibly announce would be
R*(zt+i), but such an announcement would be redundant.
According to this model, lenders are backward looking in
determining the sovereign's reputation, but are forward looking in
determining expected servicing. Moreover, the inability of a
sovereign who repudiates to issue any new debt would result
automatically from the reaction of individual lenders who form
servicing expectations according to condition (8). Although
condition (8) also implies that a sovereign could never recover a
trustworthy reputation that it had lost, this property of the
model is not restrictive because allowing recovery of reputation
is isomorphic in its effect on R*(zt+i) to raising the
sovereign's discount rate for future utility.
The problem for a rational sovereign is to choose s, bt,
and a plan Rt(z÷i), as part of an implicit program
ibt+1, Rt+(zt÷÷i) i=O'so as to maximize EtUt subject to
equations (1) —(3)and (8). These choices establish a
reputational equilibrium in which for all realizations of z1,
if the sovereign chooses s to validate the lenders' expected— 12—
contingentservicing tunction, expected utility is at least as
large as it would be it the sovereign were to maximize current
consumption by repudiating its debt. Thus, in a reputational
equilibrium, a rational sovereign always plans to service newly
issued debt in accord with the functionR*(zt+i), and in the
next period always validates lenders' servicing expectations and
keeps its trustworthy reputation by choosings1 in accord with
a function S(zti) that is identical to
The contingent servicing planR*(zt+i), accordingly, is in
the set of functionsR(z+i) that represent incentive—compatible
plans. Moreover, it is the incentive—compatible plan that
produces the largest value ofEctUt• The analytical problem is
to determine the functionR*(zti) that fits this specifica-
tion.
This function, together with specification of lenders's
expectations given by conditions (8) and the required expected
value of debt servicing given by equation (3), implies an
associated time invariant value forb, given by
(9) b =b*= p(z) R*(zt+i)/(1+p).
Equation (9) says that the sovereign borrows an amount equal to
the discounted expected value of the debt servicing impliedby the
servicing function R*(zt+1). Note that conditions (8) also
imply, because the sovereign starts with a trustworthy reputation,
that b0 equals b*.
Let the function V( •)denotethe dependence of expected
utility on the actual contingent servicing function that the
sovereign uses in period t and plans to use in period t+l and
expects to plan to use in subsequent periods. Given the
stationary structure of the problem, the sovereign expects that it
will plan to use in period t+i,i > 1, the same contingent
servicing function as it plans to use in period t+1. Thus, the
expression— 13—
EtUt=Vt[St(zt),Rt(zt+1)1
fully describes the function V( .)
Asa member of the set of incentive compatible servicing
plans, the function R*( .)satisfiesthe incentive—compatibility
conditions for period one,
(10) V [R*(z ),R*(zj] V (0,0) 1 1 1
for all possible realizations of z1 and z2.
Period one is critical because of the initial condition that in
period zero lenders expect the the actual servicing function to
be R*(z1). Equation (10) says that the function R*( .)issuch
that for all possible states of the world a plan that involves
always validating lenders' expectations that actual servicing will
conform to R*( .)wouldgenerate in period one higher expected
utility for a rational sovereign than would a decision to
repudiate.
Given that, if the sovereign honors R*(z1), lenders do not
change their expectations, any function R*( .)thatsatisfies
condition (10) also satisfies the analogous condition for period
two and, by extension, for every subsequent period. Therefore,
the sovereign's plan to honor R*( .)inthe future is time
consistent. Moreover, it is clear that any plan that involved
honoring R*(z1)in period one but repudiating in the future
would not be time consistent.
V. Efficient Risk Shifting or a Binding Lending Ceiling?
The analysis in Section II derived the contingent servicing
commitment R(zt+i), and the associated amount of borrowing b,
that produced the highest value of EctUt given that
Est[St+i(zt+i)] equals R(zt+i). If R(zt+i) is in the set of
incentive—compatible servicing plans, then R*(zt+i) equals— 14—
R(zt+i)and b* equals b. As discussed above, the amount of
borrowing b enables the sovereign both to invest efficiently,
thereby maximizing expected income, and to achieve efficient risk
shifting, which in the present framework involves shifting all
risk to the risk—neutral lenders. If, alternatively, R(zt+1) is
not in the set of incentive—compatible servicing plans, lenders
would not permit the sovereign to borrow the amount .Sucha
binding lending ceiling either would prevent the sovereign from
shifting all risk to the lenders, even if the sovereign would
continue to invest efficiently, or would prevent the sovereign
from investing efficiently, thereby facing the sovereign with a
tradeoff between expected consumption and the riskiness of
consurnpt ion.
To analyze the conditions that determine whether (zt+1) is
incentive compatible, it is necessary to evaluate condition (10)
for R*(zt+1) equal to (z÷i). Considering equation (1) for
t =1,and substituting from equation (7) for c and
i =1..., gives
(11) V1[(z1), R(z2)] =(1+u(c)
=(1+u[F(b)-(1+p)C+i].
Tocalculate V1(0,O) given that E50[S1(z1)] equals
observe that by repudiating its debts in period one, the sovereign
would obtain consumption in period one equal to F(b) +z1.At
the same time, repudiation would cause the sovereign to lose its
trustworthy reputation. Consequently, in all subsequent periods,
the equilibrium under anticipated repudiation, analyzed in Section
III, would obtain. In this equilibrium, the sovereign is unable
to borrow and, accordingly, obtains consumption equal to z.
Substituting these terms into equation (1) yields
(12) V1(0,0) =u[F()+z11
+ p(z) u(z).— 15—
Notethat equations (6) and (7) imply
F(b) +z1
=+ R(z1)
Comparison of equations (11) and (12) shows that current
considerations favor repudiation because u(c) is smaller than
u[ +R(z1)]
,whereasfuture considerations discourage
repudiation because -u[F()—(1+p)!+ziis larger than
p(z) u(z). Looking more closely at future considerations,
the factors that weigh against repudiation of R( •)area low
value of the discount rate ,greaterconcavity (risk aversion)
of the function u( •),alarger variance of the stochastic
variable z, and a larger net return from investing the loan
F(b) —(l+p)}.Looking more closely at current considerations,
the factors that weigh against repudiation of R( •)area smaller
value of R(z1) and, again, greater concavity of u( •).From
equation (6), the value of (z1) depends positively on the
difference between z1 and the mean value z and on the size
of (1+p)l, which, from equation (5), equals the larger of
(1+p)B and the difference between z and the minimum value .
Notethat, because the largest value of R(z1) obtains if the
realization of z1 is the good state 2,the incentive to
repudiate is largest in the good state. Hence, if R(Z)
satisfies condition (10), (z1) satisfies the incentive—
compatibility conditions for all possible realizations of z1.
Suppose that (z+i) does not satisfy equation (10) for
z÷1 equal to Z,and, perhaps, for some adjacent values of
In this event, the function R*(zt÷l) involves less
planned servicing for z1 equal to 2and for these adjacent
values of z1 than does R(zt+1) such that R*(zt1)
satisfies equation (10) as an equality for these states. With
R*(zt+i) less than (zti) for one or more values of z1,
equation (9) implies that b* is less than b. Given b* less
than B,equation(5) implies that b* is less than either B
or orboth.In other words, if the expected value of debt— 16—
servicingassociated with efficient investment and efficient risk
shifting is not incentive compatible, the sovereign cannot borrow
enough either to invest in its productive technology until the
marginal product equals one plus the risk—free interest rate or
for its lenders to prepay the indemnity required in the worst
state of the world under complete risk shifting or both.
The simplest case to analyze has b* sufficient for
efficient investment but insufficient for efficient risk
shifting——that is,
= >b* > B.
In this case, because investment remains efficient, the expected
values of income and consumption, given by F(b*) —(1+p)b*+z,
are still equal to c. Actual consumption, denoted by c*(zt+i),
however, depends on the realized state of the world. For example,
if (z+i) satisfies equation (10) for all realizations of
z1 less than Z,then consumption in state Zis larger than
,whereasconsumption in all other states is smaller than c.
Nevertheless, the amount of borrowing is such that the lenders
prepay an indemnity sufficient to equalize consumption in all
states other than state Z,and the contingent servicing function
enables the sovereign to shift to its lenders all risk not
associated with state Z. Specifically, the reputational
equilibrium has the following properties:
R*(Z) < R(Z),
R*(zt+i) =R(zt+1)




=— p(Z)[(Z)—R*(Z)}for all t > 0 and
for allz1 < Z.— 17—
Anotherinstructive case has b* sufficient for efficient
risk shifting but insufficient for efficient investment——that is,
b =B> b* >
In this case, the expected values of income and consumption, given
by F(b*) —(1+p)b*+j, areless than ,theexpected value of
income and consumption associated with efficient investment. The
sovereign, nevertheless, could choose an amount of borrowing and a
servicing function, with a servicing plan less than R(zt÷i) for
all realizations ofz1, such that actual consumption would be
state invariant. Even though the sovereign is risk averse,
however, it would accept some state—dependence of consumption in
order to have a higher expected value of consumption. Thus, in
general R*(zt+i) will be such that consumption in state Z is
higher than in the other states. As a final case,b* can be
insufficient both for efficient investment and for efficient risk
shifting——that is,
b* < mm (B,
In this case, the sovereign faces an even less favorable tradeoff
between the expected value of consumption and the riskiness of
consumption.
In each of these cases, even though lenders are risk neutral,
the binding lending ceiling makes risk shifting incomplete. Risk
aversion by lenders would further limit risk shifting, but would
not completely preclude risk shifting. Specifically, with risk
averse lenders, efficient risk shifting would be incomplete.
Accordingly, future considerations would weigh less heavily
against repudiation and, as a result, the sovereign would face,
ceteris paribus, a lower lending ceiling.— 18—
VI.Summary
This paper has analyzed a reputational equilibrium in a model
that interprets sovereign debts as contingent claims that both
finance investments and facilitate risk shifting. In this model,
lenders differentiate excusable default, which is associated with
implicitly understood contingencies, from unjustifiable
repudiation. The model implies that, although all bad states of
the world cause excusable default, only the worst state of the
world can produce total default. Moreover, being consistent with
lenders' expectations about debt servicing, excusable default does
not preclude continued access to loans.
Because the power to abrogate commitments without having to
answer to higher enforcement authority is an essential aspect ot
sovereignty, the sovereign's decision to validate lenders'
expectations about debt servicing depends on the sovereign's
concern for its trustworthy reputation. A trustworthy reputation
is valuable because it provides continued access to loans.
In the reputational equilibrium, the short—run gains from
repudiation are smaller than the long—run costs from loss of a
trustworthy reputation. Thus, although sovereigns sometimes
excusably default, they always resist the temptation, which is
greatest in the good state of the world, to repudiate their
debts. The reputational equilibrium can involve efficient risk
shifting and efficient investment or it can involve a binding
lending ceiling that limits risk shifting and can also restrict
investment. The factors that tend to produce a binding lending
ceiling include a high time discount rate for the sovereign, low
risk aversion for the sovereign, and a low net return from the
sovereign's investments.— 19—
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